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Physician-Industry Relationship  
 
 Over the past few decades, industry relationships with researchers have received 
increasing attention as they have steadily expanded their role in scientific research.  
These interactions can take many forms, including research grants, consulting, board 
positions, royalties, and stock options. Such associations have important potential 
implications. Nonetheless, the clarity of disclosure policies and accuracy of reporting 
such relationships have not been well studied.   
  
 Industrial research grants provide opportunities for physicians/scientists to explore 
areas that are of mutual interest with industry.  This is of importance, especially as 
traditional funding sources such as the NIH have had declining rates of grant support. 
However, conflicts of interest have the potential to create situations where the integrity of 
research can be compromised, whether at the level of study design1 or even the reporting 
of results 2,3.  These conflicts are gradually being explored 4-8. 
  
 Consulting and board positions allow industry to seek advice from those most 
knowledgeable with the application of their products or services.  This may be 
indispensable to companies that need advice to best direct their activities, and they 
reciprocate by compensating physicians/scientists for time out of practice. Yet one 
possible consequence of such relationships includes creating situations in which the 
professional judgment concerning one interest (clinical judgment) could be unduly 
influenced by another interest (keeping an esteemed consulting or board position). While 
 3 
there may not be immediate financial gain, bias can certainly be introduced in the clinical 
practice, study parameters, or interpretation of results.  
 While physician-industry affiliations may give rise to novel drugs or devices that are 
beneficial to patients, there are concerns that these ties may unduly influence the 
judgment of clinicians.  Because these commercial entities presumably have a vested 
interest in the findings of these investigations, their involvement has the potential to 
compromise the integrity of research at many different levels including the project 
design1 and the reporting of results.2,3  The term “conflict of interest” (COI) refers to any 
type of relationship between physicians and industry that may engender bias, either 
deliberate or unintentional.  Not surprisingly, the medical community as well as popular 
media has scrutinized the ramifications of financial COI on scientific studies more 
closely. 
 
 Royalties and stock allow companies to reward physicians/scientists who help them 
generate products that are directly associated with industrial revenue. Such productivity 
can be related to financial return for individuals involved in their development and 







 Industrial support for research has been on the rise in all areas of medicine.   Over one 
fourth of biomedical researchers at academic institutions have received funding from 
industry 9. Although these relationships increase the performance of research, many 
question the integrity of the results produced. 
   An abundance of literature exists which demonstrates that studies with industry 
funding are more likely to report positive results10-15.  An excellent example of this 
phenomenon is demonstrated in smoking literature. In a 1998 JAMA article, 37% of 106 
articles reviewed reported that passive smoking is not harmful16. Among the authors who 
came to this conclusion, 74% of them had affiliations with the tobacco industry.  After 
statistical analysis was performed it was shown that the only factor connected with 
reporting passive smoking is not harmful was whether an author had affiliations with the 
tobacco industry.   
 Similar trends have also been noted in pharmaceutical research10-15. Friedberg et al 
examined the relationship between industrial funding and publishing positive results in 
oncologic drug research. The studies funded by non-pharmaceutical companies were 8 
times more likely to reach negative results than those funded by industry.  Furthermore, 
research that was funded by industry was 1.4 times more likely to publish positive results 
than studies funded by non-profit agencies.   
 Shah et al also examined this issue in the field of orthopedic spine surgery. His group 
reviewed articles from the journal Spine from January 2002 to July 2003 and evaluated 
the articles for the topic, funding source and conclusion reached. Similar to the 
abovementioned studies, they reported that studies with industry funding were 1.6 times 
more likely to report positive results than studies without.  
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 The field of orthopedic surgery differs from other areas of medicine in respect to 
industry involvement. In other areas of medicine, industry involvement is mostly limited 
to drug effectiveness in randomized clinical control trials (RTCs) whereas in orthopedics 
industrial sponsorship can occur in many different study types17. Shah et al also found 
while reviewing 1143 articles published in Spine that industry funding was responsible 
for 47% of biomechanics papers, 31% of technique publications, 23% of RTCs, and 18% 
of basic science publications. The strong presence of industrial support throughout 
orthopedic research makes awareness of funding sources even more relevant when 
interpreting data.  
 Several reasons have been postulated to explain why industry funding for research 
have been associated with increased positive results in all areas of medicine. Most of 
these explanations deal with conflict of interest in the design, performance, and 
interpretation of the studies. In order for a valid study to be performed an unanswered and 
relevant question must be asked and not one that is just likely to produce favorable 
results. The interpretation of the results should also be a true representation of the 
findings of the study.  
  
 Undoubtedly, there are important consequences to financial rapport between 
physicians/scientists and the private sector.  Although the implications of these 
relationships may be debatable, transparent disclosure of relationships has been a well 
agreed-upon initial step in addressing these issues9.  Some supporters claim that the goal 
of disclosure is not necessarily to make researchers less biased, but to inform the 
readership of potential biases and allow them to draw their own conclusions27.  Others 
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argue that bias arising from financial incentives is only a small constituent of the many 
factors that influence investigators, and should not be singled out37. Regardless, the 
scientific community has widely encouraged disclosure as a strategy for protecting the 
integrity of research, and scientific journals and conferences now generally have some 
form of financial disclosure policy28. 
  
 There are two main types of disclosure policies commonly used.  The first asks 
authors to disclose all of their financial dealings with industry regardless of what 
relationships may be directly related to the research presented29,30. The second requires 
disclosure only for those relationships that are directly related to the research at hand31. 
While these two policies share the goal of creating transparency and differ only in the 
extent to which they require disclosure, a universal policy for how to uniformly address 
these issues is still missing. The existence of two such disparate systems may give rise to 
a great deal of confusion among authors about what constitutes a COI and which industry 
ties should be acknowledged.  While the issue of author disclosures has gained significant 
notoriety in recent years, there continues to be a paucity of studies examining the efficacy 
of these policies and the accuracy of the information provided by physicians.  
Furthermore, the language used in such policies can often be unclear to those filling out 
disclosure forms.   
The utilization of disclosure policies has continued to evolve as more attention is 
focused on the potential dangers associated with COI32-34. A study conducted in 1997 
looking at 1396 journals found that only 16% had disclosure policies compared to a 
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similar study conducted in 2008 where 89% of the sampled journals had some form of a 
disclosure policy34. 
Although most groups agree that there is a need for disclosure policies, the 
efficacy of these statements is still unknown.  The lack of a uniform disclosure policy has 
the ability to create confusion about what needs to be disclosed and when it should be 
disclosed.  There are no studies assessing how accurately clinician scientists are able to 
interpret the disclosure policy statements of journals and medical societies.  
Misinterpretation of financial disclosure statements has the potential to be a discrepancy 
in financial conflict of interest reporting and could have serious consequences.  
 
Professional School-Industry Relationship  
 
 Relationships between medical schools and commercial entities have been 
similarly scrutinized in recent years. This partnership offers similar benefits seen in 
physician-industry interactions and is often vital to ensure continuing progress in 
biomedical research and patient care.  The primary concern with such relationships is 
their potential to influence medical education. 
The Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) and the Accreditation 
Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME) have published guidelines to 
ensure the continued integrity of medical education and biomedical research and to assist 
members in managing industry collaborations in accord with higher standards of medical 
professionalism. Aside from focusing on many aspects of the interactions that exist 
between industry and individuals in academia, these recommendations also underscore 
the importance of this issue. 35,36  
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The influence of commercial entities on the field of medicine may affect 
physicians at every level of training.  In particular, the degree of interaction industry has 
had with medical professionals throughout all of the stages in their education raises 
questions about the overt or subtle effects of this presence in academic settings, including 
the classroom or laboratory.  For example, a recent New York Times article describes a 
pharmacology professor at Harvard Medical School who touted the benefits of 
cholesterol-lowering drugs and inappropriately minimized their side-effects without 
acknowledging to his students that he was a consultant to several pharmaceutical 
companies that market these types of medications.37 These and other similar incidents 
illustrate how industry affiliations may sway both practicing physicians and the next 
generation of healthcare providers. 
 
One method that has been proposed for enhancing the transparency of individuals 
who educate medical students is the mandatory disclosure of their industry relationships 
to their students.  This approach has been widely adopted by medical journals and 
professional societies, which have proven this strategy to be reasonably effective for 
regulating these collaborations. 9-12 Similar policies requiring medical school faculty to 
disclose their COIs may be equally as beneficial for maintaining their transparency. This 
information may allow students to form their own judgments about the merits of lectures 
given by individuals with industry connections. By emphasizing the necessity of 
divulging these relationships, these protocols may also compel physicians-in-training to 
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be cognizant of the impact of commercial ties and hopefully serve as a framework to 
guide them during their subsequent interactions with corporate interests in the future. 
 
While faculty disclosure has taken on increasing significance among medical 
practitioners, it is unclear how prevalent these policies are in other professions such as 
the legal community. COIs inevitably arise between lawyers and third parties but the 
American Bar Association (ABA), which provides accreditation of law schools and is the 
legal analog to the AAMC, does not mandate disclosure at its educational programs or 
insist that its institutions address attorney-industry relationships in a certain fashion.38 
Thus, the manner in which this issue is discussed is solely determined by each individual 
law school.   
This work will be presented in five chapters, each of which examines a specific 
hypothesis.  First, we quantified the variability in self-reported financial disclosures of 
orthopedic surgeons who presented at multiple conferences during the came calendar 
year (Chapter 1 and 2). Second, we evaluated how well orthopedic surgeons and 
trainees were able to interpret disclosure policy statements in regards to global and 
project specific instructions (Chapter 3).  We then quantified the number of medical 
schools with disclosure policies, paying specific attention to the policies on educational 
activities and the acceptance of gifts from industry (Chapter 4).  Law school policies 
were also analyzed in an identical fashion for comparison. Lastly, we reanalyzed medical 
school disclosure polices one year later to see if any significant change had been made 
during this time period.  
 
Chapter 1 
Disclosure variability figures 1 
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CHAPTER 1- Quantifying the variability of financial disclosure information 
 




 The purpose of this investigation was to compare the self-reported industry 
relationships of individuals attending three major orthopaedic sports medicine 
conferences during the same calendar year in order to calculate the variability between 
their disclosure information over time. 
 
Materials and Methods 
 We performed a retrospective review of the self-reported disclosures of the authors 
presenting at any of three major orthopaedic conferences focusing on sports medicine 
topics (2009 annual meetings of the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons 
(AAOS), Arthroscopy Association of North American (AANA), and American 
Orthopaedic Society of Sports Medicine (AOSSM)) which were printed in the final 
programs distributed by these societies.  Individuals were asked to provide their 
information at the time they submitted their abstracts which were due in June, August, 
and September of 2008 for the AAOS, AAOSM, and AANA meetings, respectively.  
While it is possible that physicians may have gained or lost industry affiliations during 
the short period of time between these deadlines, we assumed that such changes would be 
relatively rare. It is also possible that some of the companies may have consolidated in 
this time period, which would change their industry affiliations.  
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 The disclosure policies for these conferences were obtained from the AAOS, 
AAOSM, and AANA websites and corroborated with the guidelines published in 
corresponding final programs; these protocols were also verbally confirmed by the 
administrative staff of each society.  At that time, the AAOS and AANA only requested 
industry ties that were directly relevant to the study of interest whereas the AOSSM 
solicited the disclosure of all financial relationships even if they were not pertinent to the 
presentation. 
 It would be anticipated that all of the project-specific associations listed by an author 
attending either the AAOS or the AANA conferences should also be evident as a subset 
of the global disclosures captured by the AOSSM. A discrepancy was identified if 
financial relationships were listed at the project specific conferences (AAOS and AANA) 
and not included in the global conference (AOSSM).  If all of the financial COI declared 
at AAOS or AANA were also registered with the AOSSM, the author was noted to have” 
no discrepancies”; conversely, any industry relationship that was reported to the AAOS 
or AANA but not to the AOSSM was classified as a discrepancy.  However, investigators 
who had no disclosures at either the AAOS or AANA meetings but were observed to 
have financial ties at the AOSSM were not considered to have any discrepancies because 
in these instances it is conceivable that they may have not had any project-specific COI to 
convey to the AAOS or AANA but could still have received support for other research 
that would have had to be acknowledged under the global disclosure policy of the 
AOSSM.  Thus, two separate cohorts were included in this analysis – individuals who 
had attended the AAOS and AOSSM conferences as well as those with studies that had 
been accepted by the AANA and the AOSSM.  Given that the AAOS and AANA both 
Figure 1 
AOSSM 
Instructions- Global Disclosure 
Total: 239 
AAOS 
Instructions- Project Specific Disclosure 
Total: 4,652 
AANA 
Instructions- Project Specific Disclosure 
Total: 154 
Total # different authors: 5,045 









required only project-specific COI, the information released by these two societies was 
not compared since there was no reliable method of verifying that authors were actually 
presenting the same research at these two conventions. 
 For each pair of meetings (i.e. AAOS/AOSSM and AANA/AOSSM), we identified 
the authors who had consistent disclosures and those with irregularities.  In addition to 
recording the number of financial COI divulged by individuals who exhibited no 
variability, we also calculated the number of discrepancies exhibited by researchers with 
changes in their disclosure status; in particular, we focused on those who acknowledged 
no industry relationships to the AOSSM with its global policy but listed at least one 
commercial entity to either the AAOS or AOSSM which had only sought out project-
specific affiliations for their conferences. 
 
Results 
Disclosure information was available for a total of 5045 authors (4,652 authors 
for AAOS, 154 for AANA, and 239 for AOSSM)(Figure 1).  Of the individuals who 
presented at the AAOS or AANA meetings which only listed project-specific industry 
affiliations, 116 and 32, respectively, also had research accepted by the AOSSM which 
employed a global disclosure policy.  Thus, these comparisons gave rise to two discrete 
data sets (AOSSM/AAOS and AOSSM/AANA).  The mean (± standard deviation) and 
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AOSSM and AAOS 
 
The industry relationships of 116 researchers were published for both the AOSSM 
and AAOS conferences.  41% of this cohort were found to have variations in their 
disclosures of which 40% exhibited three or more discrepancies, 25% possessed two, and 
35% had only one (Figure 2a).  Moreover, 18% of the authors with irregularities 
designated “nothing to disclose” as their response to the global protocol of the AOSSM 
while acknowledging at least one project-specific financial COI to AAOS (Figure 2b). 
The remaining 59 % of authors in the AOSSM/AANA group were consistent in 
their reporting.  The majority (57%) of these individuals had no industry ties whereas 
28% and 15% identified one versus two or more commercial entities, respectively (Figure 
2a). 
 
AOSSM and AANA 
Of the thirty-two authors who presented studies at both the AOSSM and AANA 
conventions, 34 % were noted to have contradictory disclosure information.  Among the 
researchers with disparities, 55% demonstrated two or more discrepancies and 45% had 
only one (Figure 3a).  Compared to the AOSSM/AAOS cohort, an even greater 
proportion (36%) of these deviations involved individuals indicating that they had 
“nothing to disclose” to the AOSSM which requested that all industry associations be 
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Discrepancies in disclosure reporting for authors 
who attended both AOSSM and AANA 
45% 
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The other 66% of the AOSSM/AANA group submitted uniform disclosure data to 
the two meetings.  Although most (52%) of these authors had no COI, 24 % listed one 
source of industry support and another 24% recorded two or more COI (Figure 3a). 
 
Discussion 
The increasing prevalence of physician-industry collaborations and their potential 
deleterious effects on scientific endeavors has led many specialty societies and 
publications to adopt formal disclosure policies to promote transparency and preserve the 
integrity of these investigations.  Despite the widespread integration of such guidelines, 
there continues to be a paucity of data addressing the efficacy of these protocols and the 
consistency of the information provided by authors performing research in the field of 
sports medicine.  The objective of this study was to identify and characterize 
discrepancies in the self-reported disclosures of authors who presented at more than one 
orthopaedic sports medicine conference during the same calendar year.  
 As part of this analysis, we examined the project-specific industry relationships 
that were required by the AAOS and AANA as subsets of the global disclosures 
stipulated by the AOSSM.  However, we did not compare the so-called “relevant” 
financial relationships solicited by the AAOS and AANA because of difficulties 
associated with verifying that an author was presenting the same project at both 
conferences. 
The results of this review demonstrate that a significant percentage of individuals 
attending these meetings were found to have inconsistencies in the disclosure information 
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Present 





Type of discrepancy 
0 AOSSM  
disclosure 
vs. 1+ AANA  
disclosure 1+ disclosure at 
both conferences 
Percentage of common AANA/AOSSM authors 
who disclosed something at AANA vs. nothing at  
AOSSM 
 15 
and AOSSM/AANA cohorts, respectively).  Furthermore, in both groups the majority of 
the authors with irregularities exhibited more than one discrepancy (65% for 
AOSSM/AAOS and 55% for AOSSM/AANA).  While it is certainly conceivable that 
researchers may have gained or lost financial COI between the deadlines for these 
conferences (June, August, and September 2008 for the AAOS, AOSSM, and AANA 
conventions, respectively), we maintain that it would be unlikely for so many authors to 
experience such dramatic changes in the number and type of their industry affiliations 
during a brief period of a few months. However, it is also possible that some of the 
companies may have consolidated in this time period, which would change their industry 
affiliations.  
 
In addition, a substantial proportion of the individuals with incongruent data had 
affirmed that they had “nothing to disclose” to the AOSSM which utilized a global 
disclosure policy but had listed at least one commercial entity with the AAOS or AANA 
which at the time had only requested the acknowledgement of financial ties that were 
germane to the investigation of interest (18% for AOSSM/AAOS and 36% for 
AOSSM/AANA).  One plausible explanation for this finding is that researchers may have 
failed to differentiate between the various sets of guidelines established by these societies 
and incorrectly assumed that they only needed to list COI that were directly pertinent to 
their work.  Another possibility is that these authors may have unintentionally excluded 
certain industry relationships that should have otherwise been reported.  Nevertheless, 
these disparities serve to underscore the inherent deficiencies of the current systems for 
generating accurate and consistent disclosure data.   
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Not surprisingly, more than half of the individuals in the AOSSM/AAOS and 
AOSSM/AANA cohorts without any discrepancies in their disclosure records did not list 
any COI (57% and 52%, respectively).  Authors with no financial ties would presumably 
be less prone to provide incorrect information because they would be able to simply 
declare “nothing to disclose” for every meeting regardless of its policy. 
This study is not without its limitations.  As mentioned previously, the deadline 
for the disclosure of industry relationships was different for each of these conferences but 
since they were all within a few months of each other we are confident that very few 
actual changes in the disclosure status of these authors would have occurred during such 
a short period of time.  We also recognize that these two cohorts represent only a small 
fraction of the total number of presenters at these meetings (116 for AOSSM/AAOS and 
32 for AOSSM/AANA; however, both sets of analyses gave rise to similar results which 
collectively serve to support our conclusions. 
 This review highlights the considerable variability that existed in the self-reported 
disclosure information published for three recent orthopaedic conferences focusing on 
sports medicine research.  We believe that the vast majority of the observed discrepancies 
were not due to intentional deception on the part of the authors but rather arose because 
of ongoing confusion regarding which industry relationships should be acknowledged 
depending upon the specific guidelines in effect for a particular meeting.  In the absence 
of a uniform disclosure policy that is widely adopted by many specialty societies, these 
findings suggest that the disclosure process will continue to be plagued by the 
inconsistent reporting of financial COI.  Further comparative studies must be performed 
in order to determine which system for identifying sources of industry support (i.e. global 
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vs. project specific) is most effective for creating full transparency and minimizing the 




























Disclosure variability figures 7 
 18 
 
CHAPTER 2- Variability of Financial disclosure information reported by 
authors presenting at annual spine conferences 
Objectives 
 The goal of the current study was to compare the self-reported disclosures of authors 
attending spine conferences from the same year and to quantify the variability between 
their disclosures at each conference. The conferences that were analyzed include the 2008 
North American Spine Society (NASS), Cervical Spine Research Society (CSRS), and 
Scoliosis Research Society (SRS). 
 
Materials and Methods 
  
 We performed a retrospective review of disclosure listings from three annual spine 
conferences which occurred in 2008. We examined the disclosure information for all of 
the authors at the North American Spine Society (NASS), Cervical Spine Research 
Society (CSRS), and Scoliosis Research Society (SRS) conferences. Disclosure listings 
for authors who attended each conference were obtained from the final programs 
published by each society (publically available information).  
 
 The abstract submission deadline when authors were required to submit their 
disclosures was in February 2008 for NASS and SRS, and June 2008 for CSRS. 
Although small changes in disclosures may have occurred during the time interval 
between these deadlines, we made the assumption that such changes would be negligible. 
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 The official disclosure policy for each meeting was obtained from the societies’ 
websites and cross-checked with the disclosure policies stated in the final programs. 
NASS and CSRS required global disclosure of any and all financial relationships, 
regardless of relevance to the presentation. SRS requested only project-specific 
disclosures relevant to the research being presented.  
 
Based on these policies, we were able to directly compare disclosures of authors who 
attended both NASS and CSRS, understanding that author disclosures should be identical 
at each conference because of the similar disclosure policies for each conference. For 
example, if an author reported three distinct entities to NASS and reported those same 
three entities to CSRS, that author would be counted as having “no discrepancies”. If 
another author reported three different entities to NASS and only two of those entities to 
CSRS, that author would be counted as having “one discrepancy”. 
 
 Due to the project-specific disclosures required by SRS, we used a different strategy 
to compare the author disclosures at SRS to those at NASS and CSRS. Since NASS and 
CSRS requested global disclosure, any author presenting at SRS and NASS or CSRS 
should have reported all of their project specific disclosures (from SRS) to NASS or 
CSRS. In other words, whatever an author disclosed at SRS should be present as a subset 
of the global disclosures reported at NASS or CSRS. For example, if all of the project-
specific disclosures an author declared at SRS were present within the larger set of 
disclosures reported at NASS or CSRS, we counted this author as having “no 
discrepancies”; however, this is not to say that the author’s disclosures must be exactly 
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identical because the author may have reported more financial relationships under the 
global disclosure policy. Similarly, if a disclosure was reported at SRS but not at NASS 
or CSRS, this was counted as “one discrepancy”. If an author disclosed nothing at SRS 
but something at NASS or CSRS, this was still counted as “no discrepancy” because the 
author may not have had any project-specific disclosures to report at SRS, yet still have 
financial support for other projects that must be reported under the global disclosure 
policy of NASS and CSRS. 
 
 We compared the disclosures of authors who attended any two of the three 
conferences, giving us three sets of comparisons: disclosures of authors who attended 
NASS/CSRS, disclosures of authors who attended SRS/NASS, and disclosures of authors 
who attended SRS/CSRS. For each pair of conferences, we analyzed the number of 
common authors who had completely consistent disclosures and those with discrepancies 
in their disclosures between the two conferences. For those authors with discrepancies, 
we further examined the number of discrepancies they had and the number of authors 
who disclosed nothing at one conference yet declared one or more financial relationships 
at the other. For those authors whose disclosures completely matched at both 





Disclosure information was listed for 1,231 authors at NASS, 550 at CSRS, and 
642 at SRS; of these individuals, 278 (NASS), 129 (CSRS), and 181 (SRS) presented at 
one of the other conferences. Forty authors presented at all three conferences. Of the 
three sets of comparison we analyzed in this study, 153 authors presented at both NASS 
and CSRS, 205 authors presented at both SRS and NASS, and 56 authors presented at 
both SRS and CSRS. These three-comparison sets sum to 334 distinct authors out of a 
grand total of 2049 different authors from all three conferences (Figure 1).  
 
According to their policies, NASS and CSRS required disclosure of all financial 
relationships, while SRS only requested disclosures pertinent to the paper being 
presented. The mean (± standard deviation) and median number of disclosures for the 334 
authors making up our three comparison sets was 1.8 (± 3.5) and 1, respectively.  
 
NASS and CSRS 
 
153 authors presented at both NASS and CSRS. 51% had discrepancies in their 
disclosure information. Of these authors with discrepancies, 32% had one discrepancy, 
24% had two discrepancies, and 44% had three or more discrepancies in their disclosures. 
Also, for the authors with discrepancies, 45% reported “nothing to disclose” at one 
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The other 49% of authors who attended both NASS and CSRS were completely 
consistent in their reporting of disclosures between conferences. The majority (67%) of 
authors in this group reported no disclosures, while 20% reported one disclosure, and 
13% reported two or more disclosures (Figure 2a). This trend of authors who were 
consistent in reporting disclosures having mostly zero disclosures (and decreasingly 1 or 
2+ disclosures) was seen across the three sets of comparisons for different pairs of 
meetings (Figure 2a, 3a, 4a). 
 
Seeing that about half the authors who attended NASS and CSRS had 
discrepancies in their global disclosures, we then compared project-specific SRS 
disclosures to the global disclosures requested at NASS and CSRS separately. 
 
SRS and NASS 
 
205 authors presented at both SRS and NASS. Only 9% had inconsistencies in 
their reported disclosures. Of these authors with inconsistencies, 95% had one 
discrepancy and 5% had two or more discrepancies. Also, for the authors with 
inconsistencies, 42% declared “nothing to disclose” in the global disclosures at NASS 
while disclosing at least one financial relationship to SRS (Figure 3a, 3b). 
 
The other 91% of authors who attended both SRS and NASS were completely consistent 
in their reporting of disclosures between conferences. The majority (74%) of authors in 
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this group reported no disclosures, while 13% reported one disclosure, and 13% reported 
two or more disclosures (Figure 3a). 
SRS and CSRS 
 
56 authors presented at both SRS and CSRS. Only 18% had discrepancies in their 
disclosure information. Of these authors with discrepancies, 60% had one discrepancy 
and 40% had two or more discrepancies. Also, for the authors with discrepancies, 50% 
reported “nothing to disclose” in the global disclosures at CSRS while disclosing at least 
one financial relationship to SRS (Figure 4a, 4b).  
 
The other 82% of authors who attended both SRS and CSRS were completely 
consistent in their reporting of disclosures between conferences. The majority (76%) of 
authors in this group reported no disclosures, while 9% reported one disclosure, and 15% 
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The landscape of disclosures has changed significantly over the past few years, 
and most journals and societies now have some form of disclosure policy in order to keep 
pace with the ever-rising benchmark of integrity demanded of scientific research. Yet 
there is currently very little data addressing the consistency of disclosure reporting among 
authors in the orthopaedic field. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the variability 
in the self-reported disclosures of individual authors presenting at multiple spine 
conferences in a single year. 
 
In this study we found a surprisingly large number of inconsistencies in reported 
disclosures. One of every two authors (51%) presenting at NASS and CSRS had 
discrepancies in their self-reported disclosures, despite the two conferences’ similar 
disclosure policies (global disclosure). Furthermore, not only did these authors with 
discrepancies have just one or two discrepancies, but almost half of them (44%) had three 
or more discrepancies between what they disclosed at NASS and what they disclosed at 
CSRS. While it is possible that researchers lost or gained financial relationships during 
the four month period between the abstract submission deadline for NASS (February 
2008) and CSRS (June 2008), we would not expect such a large percentage to change by 
three or more associations during this short period. Additionally, for the authors with 
inconsistencies, 45% disclosed nothing at one conference yet at least one relationship at 
the other. For such a large proportion of authors to choose to disclose financial support at 
one conference and then fail to disclose anything at the other hints at a larger problem 
with our current system of disclosure.   
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A possible explanation for these inconsistencies is that, while authors were instructed to 
provide global disclosure information to both NASS and CSRS, they may have 
misinterpreted the instructions and only provided project-specific disclosures since those 
relationships were the ones most pertinent to their presentation. Alternatively, authors 
could simply be having trouble keeping track of all their various financial relationships. 
In either case, there was a significant degree of variability in the self-reported global 
disclosures of authors attending NASS and CSRS. 
 
Looking at the other half of the authors who attended NASS and CSRS and were 
consistent in their disclosures offers an interesting picture as well. The majority (67%) of 
authors in this group were those who had nothing to disclose. This observation was 
similar for the other two sets of comparisons as well (i.e.- authors who presented at SRS 
and NASS, authors who presented at SRS and CSRS). Understandably, it is easier to 
remain consistent if one does not have any industrial ties and can therefore declare “no 
disclosures” across the board. 
 
Due to the high frequency of discrepancies found in author disclosures at NASS 
and CSRS, we evaluated the project-specific disclosures required by SRS as a subset of 
what should have been disclosed at the other conferences with global disclosure policies. 
In comparing author disclosures for those who attended SRS and NASS, we found that 
only 9% of the authors had discrepancies. Of these authors, the vast majority (95%) 
differed by only one disclosure between the two conferences. 42% of the authors with 
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inconsistencies disclosed financial relationships at SRS but nothing at NASS. The finding 
that 91% of authors were consistent in their disclosures when comparing project-specific 
disclosures at SRS to global disclosures at NASS lends further support to the idea that 
authors may be more consistently disclosing financial relationships that are directly 
pertinent to their presentation. In other words, when authors were prompted only for 
project-specific disclosures (SRS) there was less confusion and potentially greater 
accuracy.  
  
In the final set of comparisons made in this study, 82% of the authors who 
attended SRS and CSRS had consistent disclosures. And for those authors with 
discrepancies, 50% disclosed financial relationships at SRS but nothing at CSRS. This 
data mirrors that of the SRS/NASS comparison supporting that project-specific disclosure 
is likely more accurate; however, this set of comparisons is limited by the smaller number 
of presenting authors common to these two conferences.   
 
This study emphasizes the variability in the self-reported disclosure information at 
three major spine conferences within the past year. Rather than attributing these results to 
intentional duplicity, we believe that these discrepancies are most likely due to confusion 
regarding what relationships should be disclosed in different circumstances and the lack 
of uniform disclosure policies among these various associations. Our findings suggest 
that perhaps authors are more consistent at reporting project-specific relationships. Yet an 
inherent issue with project-specific disclosures is that it may often be difficult to discern 
what financial relationships are relevant to an author’s frame of mind and research 
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endeavors. This is, in fact, the reason many forums have found global disclosure to be the 
most transparent policy.   
 
 Many organizations, such as NASS, CSRS, and SRS, have recognized that there are 
growing complexities and nuances involved in the reporting of financial relationships and 
are currently updating their disclosure policies to more accurately reflect how modern 
medical research interacts with the private sector. This is an important step in the 
development of an effective system of disclosure to help authors consistently declare 
financial relationships. Based on the notable inconsistencies in the disclosure information 
provided by spine surgeons at the meetings evaluated, we believe that more explicit and 
standardized guidelines need to be established in order to facilitate the accurate disclosure 













Disclosure variability figures 15 
 28 
CHAPTER 3 – Significant Variation Seen in the Interpretation of Financial  
 




The purpose of our study was to evaluate how well orthopaedic surgeons are able 




Materials and Methods 
A questionnaire survey was generated from disclosure policy statements of ten 
orthopaedics societies and journals. The disclosure policy statements of the ten most 
frequently attended conferences with the highest abstract submission by the orthopaedic 
staff and trainees at Yale Orthopaedic Department were chosen. Excerpts that contained 
the most relevant information regarding the desired method of financial disclosure were 
taken from each policy statement to form the final survey.  
The subjects were asked to read each statement in its entirety and identify the 
statement as either project-specific disclosure or global disclosure. Project- specific was 
selected if the reader felt that the statement required financial disclosure only for the 
project being presented. Global disclosure was selected if the reader interpreted the 
statement as requiring all financial relationships were to be disclosed. . The disclosure 
policies for these groups were obtained from their websites and were verbally confirmed 
by the administrative staff of each society.  
Out of the ten policy statements used in the survey, 7 required project specific 
disclosing and the remaining 3 were global policies. The seven project specific 
statements were from the American Association of Orthopaedic Surgery (AAOS), 
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American Association of Hip and Knee Surgeons (AAHKS), American Society for 
Surgery of the Hand (ASSH), Scoliosis Research Society (SRS), Arthroscopy 
Association of North America (AANA), American Spinal Injury Association (ASIA), and 
the Orthopaedic Trauma Association (OTA). American Orthopedic Society of Sports 
Medicine (AOSSM), Cervical Spine Research Society (CSRS), and North American 
Spine Society (NASS) were the three global policy statements used in the survey.  
 The survey had a 100% return rate among all staff and trainees in the department 
of orthopedics at Yale New Haven Hospital. A total of sixty-seven people completed the 
survey, which includes 17 attending orthopedic surgeons, 25 orthopaedic 
residents/fellows, and 25 medical students. The number of medical students who were 
selected to complete the survey was chosen to match the number of residents/fellows. 
The average number of incorrect responses was determined over all training levels. The 
average number of incorrect responses was also analyzed by training level. Attention was 
also paid to differences in the rate of incorrect responses of project specific policies 
versus global policies.  
Results 
The survey had a 100% return rate from all levels of training in the Department of 
Orthopedics at Yale School of Medicine. The average number of incorrect responses was 
2.62 among the 67 subjects who completed the survey (Figure1a,b). Forty four percent of 
those who completed the survey had three or more incorrect responses. Two incorrect 
responses were seen in 31% of the subjects. Twenty percent of those completing the 




14% and 10% respectively. Twelve percent of the subjects had no incorrect answers 
while 13% had only one.  
There was no significant difference in responses with training level. Among 
attendings, 43% answered 3 or more questions incorrectly, 30% answered two questions 
incorrectly, 17% had one incorrect response, and 9% had no incorrect responses 
(Figure2a).  Fourteen percent of the surgical residents identified no policies incorrectly; 
14%, 32 % and 41% identified one, two, and three or more questions incorrectly 
respectively (Figure2b).  . Among students, 45% answered 3 or more questions 
incorrectly, 31% answered two questions incorrectly, 17% had one incorrect response, 
and 7% had no incorrect responses (Figure2c).   
A chi square analysis was performed to determine if any difference in the 
probability of answering a global question incorrectly versus a project specific question 
incorrectly exists. The results showed that subjects were no more likely to answer a 
















Relationships between physicians and industry in scientific research have led 
many specialty societies and publications to formally adopt disclosure policies to 
promote transparency among authors. Although many entities have incorporated such 
policies into their practices, there is still a paucity of data on their efficacy. Currently, a 
lack of uniformity exists in the disclosure policy statements of various societies and 
publications. The heterogeneity of these policies can even be seen within specialties, 
which obligates the author to correctly interpret the policy statement to avoid any 
discrepancies in COI reporting. The purpose of our study was to evaluate how well 
orthopedic surgeons, a specialty that has especially been affected by discrepancies of 
reporting COI, were able to interpret and understand disclosure policy statements.  
 The data implies that there is a clear disconnect between what societies intend to 
communicate and what the readers understand. Almost half of those completing the 
survey incorrectly identified three or more policies. Each incorrect response can be seen 
as a potential discrepancy in conflict of interest disclosing and could have serious 
consequences. For example, if an author with multiple industry affiliations interprets a 
global disclosure policy as project specific this will lead to discrepancies in COI 
reporting.  
Accurate interpretation of these policies is crucial to avoid unintentional errors in 
information that is disclosed by an author. The results show an average of almost 3 
incorrectly indentified disclosure policies independent of training level. The rate of 
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incorrect responses gives support to the idea that authors may not fully understand what 
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CHAPTER 4- Disclosure Policies of Professional Schools Regarding Student 
 




         The purpose of this study was to quantify the number of medical schools with 
policies that specifically require faculty disclosure of financial relationships to their 
institutions and/or their students and to characterize their policies regarding the 
acceptance of gifts from industry. In addition, these guidelines were also compared with 
any analogous protocols implemented by law schools in an attempt to assess the relative 
importance of reporting COIs within each respective field.   
 
 
Materials and Methods 
Medical School Review 
 
A list of the 131 medical schools accredited by the Association of American 
Medical Colleges (AAMC) was obtained from its official website (www.aamc.org). The 
disclosure policies and physician-industry interaction protocols for all of these 
institutions are publically available and were acquired from each school’s website during 





Disclosure policy to students 
 
Each disclosure policy was analyzed using several criteria. First, we noted which 
medical schools had established formal guidelines requiring classroom lecturers to 
disclose their industry affiliations to their students. We subsequently determined whether 
the institution had similar policies dictating that faculty members divulge their 
commercial ties to students with whom they would be performing research. Finally, we 
calculated the proportion of medical schools that were also accredited by the 
Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME). 
 
The rationale for characterizing the proportion of ACCME-accredited medical 
schools was that this organization issues specific guidelines to its member institutions 
regarding disclosure of industry relationships.39 These ACCME directives apply to 
individuals who seek Continuing Medical Education (CME) credits or participate in these 
events. According to these regulations, lecturers at sanctioned speaking engagements 
must disclose any relevant commercial ties prior to the beginning of the educational 
activity. Even though the ACCME protocol is not necessarily part of medical schools’ 
formal policies, the adherence to these principles reflects an increasing awareness of the 







Physician-industry interaction policy 
 
Each medical school’s policy regarding physician-industry interactions was also 
reviewed for statements that related to the acceptance of gifts by physicians or other 
academic faculty from commercial entities. We quantified the proportion of medical 
schools that explicitly prohibited the receipt of gifts and/or defined the types of items that 
were allowed. 
 
Law School Review  
 
A similar evaluation of law schools was performed for the purpose of comparison 
to the data collected for the medical schools. The 200 law schools accredited by the 
American Bar Association (ABA) were identified from its official website (www.aba.org). 
The disclosure guidelines and policies for attorney-industry interactions of these 
institutions are all publicly available and were recorded from each school’s website. All 
protocols were analyzed using the same methods that were described previously for the 
medical school policies during the month of September 2009.   
 
While law schools are accredited by the American Bar Association, there is no national 
governing body equivalent to the ACCME that oversees legal education; in each state this 
responsibility is generally fulfilled by its supreme court or another designated committee. 
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The American Academy of Law Schools (AALS) is a close analog of the AAMC that 
supports legal education, but it is not involved in the accreditation of law schools. 
Results 
 
Medical School Policies 
 
Disclosure policies  
Of the 131 AAMC-accredited medical schools in 2009 and 2010, 98% had 
policies in place requiring faculty members to disclose their financial relationships to 
their institution, and the ACCME accredited 92% of the schools (Figure 1a,b).  
 However, in 2009 just 4% of the medical schools were found to have formal 
guidelines obliging lecturers to divulge their commercial interests to students prior to the 
beginning of an educational activity, and 5% of these institutions expected faculty to 
convey their industry affiliations to those engaging in joint research projects. Not much 
changed in 2010, with 5% of medical schools having lecture policies and 7% having 
polices that require faculty to disclose in research endeavors. Only 2% of all medical 
schools in 2009, and 5% in 2010 expected disclosure information to be reported to 
individuals in both of these situations (lecturing and research).   
 
Physician-industry interaction policies 
Although in 2009, 22% of medical schools prohibited the receipt of any item from 
an industry source regardless of its monetary value, more than half (60%) had no 
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Medical school policies on industry gifts 
Figure 2b 
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institutions set specific limits for these gifts; of this cohort of schools, 15% allowed the 
acceptance of nominal benefits related to “academic pursuits” (i.e. office supplies, 
honoraria, or travel reimbursements) and 3% capped the total value of gifts accepted to 
less than $300 annually. Physician-industry interaction policies in 2010 were very similar 
as shown in the figure.  
 
 
Law School Policies 
 
Of the 200 law schools accredited by the ABA, 18% had adopted policies 
requiring faculty to disclose their financial relationships to their institution (Figure 3). 
However, none of these institutions stipulated that lecturers acknowledge their industry 
relationships to students prior to the beginning of an educational activity or embarking on 
research endeavors. Only 1% of law schools regulated the gifts that professors were able 
to accept from commercial interests; moreover, the protocols that did exist were vague 
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The nature of physician-industry relationships and the ways in which the public 
views them has changed dramatically over the past decade. For this reason, the medical 
community has sought to develop specific policies to regulate these types of interactions. 
Disclosure policies have been enacted in part because of the potential adverse effects on 
patient care and the integrity of biomedical research. In an attempt to address these 
concerns and maintain the transparency of their faculty, many medical institutions are 
continuing to revise their guidelines; consequently, the types of protocols that are 
currently being employed have not been well elucidated. The purpose of this study was to 
quantify the number of medical schools that already have established disclosure policies 
and to evaluate the restrictions that they may have in place regarding the gifts that faculty 
may accept from commercial entities. 
 
Based on our investigation, it is apparent that nearly all (98%) of the medical 
schools have some sort of policy requiring disclosure of industry ties to the institution 
itself. Furthermore, 92% of these institutions are also accredited by the ACCME and are 
therefore bound to their guidelines for CME activities. Conversely, a surprisingly small 
percentages of schools have formal policies insisting that faculty divulge their industry 
relationships to the students they teach or supervise in a laboratory setting (4% and 5%, 
respectively). The finding that only a small minority of medical schools mandate 
disclosure for student-directed activities may be indicative of the need for additional 
strategies to maximize transparency and further limit the influence of industry on 
academic pursuits. The concept of disclosure as a paradigm for managing possible COIs 
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has been widely utilized by medical journals and societies, and it may be a viable option 
for medical schools as well. Of note, we were surprised not to see significantly greater 
restriction imposed between 2009 and 2010, a time when this topic is of such widespread 
interest. We expect the prevalence of these institution-driven regulatory policies to 
increase substantially during the coming years.    
 
Although the training programs for medicine and other professions are not 
entirely analogous, law schools were selected as a benchmark for comparison. Among the 
institutions accredited by the ABA, only 18% had published disclosure policies and none 
appeared to expect speakers to inform students of corporate support or other COIs in the 
classroom or any other situation. Although the Association of American Law Schools 
(AALS) has recognized the significance of disclosure-related issues, there are still no 
formal guidelines that have been mandated for the institutions under its auspices39. 
 
This analysis also confirms that less than half (40%) of the medical schools had 
definite policies limiting the acceptance of gifts from third parties. Only 22% of medical 
schools prohibited faculty from receiving any items from commercial sources, regardless 
of their monetary value. While 18% of medical schools allowed for the provision of 
certain gifts that were of benefit to “academic pursuits” such as office supplies, 
honoraria, and travel reimbursements; however these policies were often vague and 
subject to interpretation.  
We recognize that there are several limitations to this study. First, these findings 
are derived from the guidelines posted on the official internet website of each school so 
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this review does not take into account internal documents that may exist regarding the 
management of industry relationships; because of delays in updating these websites, it is 
conceivable that these listings may not represent the most recent policies of these 
institutions. It is possible that a survey of these schools may have circumvented this 
problem but we elected not to send out questionnaires due to the potential for non-
responder bias and an inability to monitor whether the individuals who furnished the 
requested information were fully familiar with their institutions’ complex disclosure 
protocols. As a result, we believe that the listings available on these schools’ websites are 
a relatively accurate reflection of their official policies.   
 
Given that virtually all medical schools have introduced some form of disclosure 
policy, it is obvious that the issue of COIs and their deleterious effects on faculty as well 
as the education of the next generation of practitioners has taken on greater importance. 
The significantly lower number of institutions requiring the reporting of financial 
relationships to students during educational activities and the variability in the degree to 
which they restrict the acceptance of gifts from commercial entities indicates that 
additional work needs to be done to develop more coherent guidelines to regulate these 
types of interactions; however, even now these standards are considerably more stringent 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
 The increasing interactions between physicians and industry have led many entities to 
adopt financial disclosure policies including professional schools. However, the efficacy 
of the policies has not been properly investigated.  The work presented here clearly 
demonstrates that additional emphasis needs to be place formulation and implementation 
of financial disclosure policies.  
  In two separate studies evaluating self reported financial disclosures of individual 
authors at three subspecialty meetings during the same calendar year we found alarming 
rates of discrepancies. Although the disclosure information of individuals may change 
periodically, such marked differences would not be expected over such a short period of 
time. However, rather than attributing these results to intentional deception, we believe 
that these discrepancies are more likely due to confusion regarding what should be 
disclosed in different circumstances and the lack of uniform disclosure policies among 
these various associations.  
 Our hypothesis was further supported when we generated a questionnaire 
assessing how well orthopedic surgeons were able to interpret and understand disclosure 
policy statements. Almost half of those completing the survey had three or more incorrect 
responses. The results suggest that there is a clear disconnect between what the policies 
are intended to convey and what the readers interpret. Subjects were no more likely to 
answer a project specific question incorrectly than they were to answer a global question 
incorrectly which is pertinent when considering a uniform policy.  
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 The widespread implementation of disclosure guidelines in medical schools 
emphasizes the acknowledged need to regulate physician-industry relationships. The 
varied policies addressing faculty disclosures and the acceptance of gifts demonstrate that 
the regulation to these relationships remains inconsistent. Nonetheless, it appears that the 
academic medical arena is addressing these issues to a greater extent than their 
counterparts in law.   
 The collective findings described in these five studies supports adopting a 
universal disclosure policy with clear and concise language. Orthopedic societies and 
professional schools have taken an important first step by adopting disclosure policies to 
manage potential conflict of interests. However, the data presented seriously questions 
the efficacy of the policies that have been implemented. For these policies to serve their 
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  Disclosure Policy Statements                                                                   Student                                            
 
  
Below are excerpts of financial disclosure policy statements from ten orthopedic 
societies. Please read each statement in its entirety.    
Check project-specific disclosure if the statement requires financial disclosure only for 
the project being presented.  
  
Check global disclosure if all financial relationships are required to be disclosed.  




Disclosure Policy Statements  
    
Please Check One 
 
1.   Obligation to disclose all potentially conflicting interests. Each 
participant must disclose relevant activities or relationships through the 









2.  Required to disclose if individual either has no relevant financial 
relationship or any financial relationship with the manufacturer(s) of any 
commercial product(s) and/or providers of commercial services 









3.   Each participant has been asked to disclose if he or she has received 
something of value (any item, payment, or service valued in excess of 
$500) from a commercial company or institution, which relates directly 
or indirectly to the subject of their presentation.  
 








Disclosure Policy Statements  
    
Please Check One 
 
4.   Instructions, planners, and managers who affect the content of a 
CME activity are required to disclose to the ASSH financial 
relationships or relationships to products or devices they have with 
commercial interest associated with this CME activity of any amount 
over the past 12 months ONLY. 







5.  The actions and expressions in providing education of the highest 
quality must be as free of outside influences as possible. Therefore, 
any relevant, potentially conflicting interests and all commercial 








6.    All faculty will disclose to the audience any real or apparent 
conflict(s) of interest related to the content of their presentation(s). 
Faculty relationships with companies whose products and/or 
services may be mentioned in their presentations will be indicated 
















Disclosure Policy Statements 
   
Please Check One 
 
7.   The disclosure policy requires that faculty submit all financial 
relationships that create a potential conflict. Each participant in the 
Annual Meeting has been asked to disclose if he or she received 
something of value from a commercial company or institution, which 










8.   I (or a member of my immediate family) have a financial interest or 
relationship with a commercial company related directly or indirectly to 











9.  Members participating in an activity should disclose all financial 
relationships that have occurred during the prior calendar year with an 
estimated value of greater than one hundred dollars ($100), using the 










10.    Paper authors whose presentations have a * by the title have indicated 
they or their co-authors (department) received something of value (in 
excess of $500) from a commercial company or institution which 
relates directly or indirectly to the subject of their presentation 
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